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GENDER BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
AND THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION
INTRODUCTION
New York State's peremptory challenge statute1 allows an
attorney to exclude a prospective juror from a petit jury2 "for
which no reason needs to be assigned." 3 In the past, attorneys
have, in most cases, 4 been allowed unrestricted use of
peremptory challenges.5 More recently, the New York State
courts have begun to inquire into the attorney's motive for
excluding certain groups of prospective jurors. 6 In the past few
years, the court of appeals has firmly established that attorneys
are prohibited from using peremptory challenges for racially
discriminatory purposes. 7 The court of appeals, however, has not
1. N.Y. CRni. PRoc. LAW § 270.25(1) (McKinney 1982).
2. Petit jury is an ordinary jury selected for criminal or civil cases that is
distinguishable from a grand jury. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 856 (6th ed.
1990).
3. N.Y. C~mu. PROC. LAW § 270.25(1) (McKinney 1982).
4. Prior disputes have mostly centered on the number of peremptory
challenges allowed for certain crimes. See, e.g., People v. Anthony, 24
N.Y.2d 696, 249 N.E.2d 747, 301 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1969) (no prejudice when
court allowed thirty challenges); People v. King, 47 A.D.2d 594, 363
N.Y.S.2d 682 (4th Dep't 1975) (defendants were granted ten additional
peremptory challenges in violation of the statute).
5. People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d 1056, 1065, 526 N.Y.S.2d 367, 373
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 740, 557 N.E.2d
1198, 558 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1990). "Until recently, it had been a long-standing
policy in New York not to inquire into a lawyer's reason for the use of a
peremptory challenge." Id.
6. See, e.g., People v. Hemandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 552 N.E.2d 621, 553
N.Y.S.2d 85 (1990), aft'd, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991); People v. Jenkins, 75
N.Y.2d 550, 554 N.E.2d 47, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1990); People v. Kern, 75
N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
77 (1990); People v. Scott, 70 N.Y.2d 420, 516 N.E.2d 1208, 522 N.Y.S.2d
94 (1987).
7. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d at 556, 554 N.E.2d at 50, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 13
(prosecution prohibited from excluding prospective black jurors from a petit
jury); Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 643, 554 N.E.2d at 1236, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 648
(defendant prohibited from excluding prospective black jurors from a petit
1
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yet been given the opportunity to decide whether this prohibition
extends to gender based discrimination. 8
This Comment takes the view that such gender based
discrimination is prohibited by the New York State Constitution.
Gender based discrimination adversely affects the criminal
defendant's 9 right to an impartial jury, 10 and it also unfairly
denies women11 the right of citizenship to serve on a jury. 12 In
jury); Scott, 70 N.Y.2d at 425, 516 N.E.2d at 1211, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 97
(defendant established a prima facie claim that the prosecution uses its
peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the petit jury).
8. People v. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d 86, 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (2d Dep't
1990) affid on remand, No. 901-05958, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12602
(2d Dep't Oct. 7, 1991). "[The question of the use of peremptory challenges
to discriminate based on gender is relatively novel." Id.
The United States Supreme Court has also not addressed this issue. People v.
Irizarry, 165 A.D.2d 715, 716, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (1st Dep't 1990).
9. Discussion of defendant rights in civil proceedings is beyond the scope
of this Comment. This Comment will focus on a defendant's federal and state
constitutional rights in a criminal proceeding. Generally speaking, defendants
in a civil proceeding enjoy less Federal Constitutional protection. For
example, civil litigants do not enjoy sixth amendment rights. See
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 437 (1986) (holding that
orders disqualifying counsel in a civil case do not qualify for interlocutory
appeal).
10. See infra Part III, sections C and E.
11. The focus of this Comment will be on female prospective jurors' rights
under the New York State Constitution. Men, of course, are also subject to
systematic exclusion solely on the basis of gender by an attorney's use of
peremptory challenges and are entitled to the same federal and state
constitutional protections as provided for women. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 191, 210 (1976) (holding that men and women are given the same equal
protection rights under the Federal Constitution from instances of gender based
discrimination); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 168, 474 N.E.2d 567,
576, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 216 (1984) (holding that the New York State
Constitution's equal protection clause protects men from instances of gender
based discrimination).
While not addressed in this Comment, such instances of alleged
discrimination do exist. See State v. Adams, 533 So. 2d 1060 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (no sixth amendment violation when prosecution excluded men from
female defendant's trial); Rosenthal v. Weckstein, 19 Mass. App. 944, 473
N.E.2d 202 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (comments made by judge as to possible
sixth amendment violation when plaintiff excluded men from jury were not
prejudicial to plaintiff); State v. Olivera, 534 A.2d 867 (R.I. 1987) (no sixth
[Vol 8
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Part I, this Comment begins with a historical perspective of
women and jury service in New York State. It then provides a
brief background of the jury selection process in New York State,
expanding on the challenge for cause and peremptory challenge
rules. Part II examines several United States Supreme Court
decisions regarding the criminal defendant's and female
prospective juror's rights under the Federal Constitution. This
Part concludes that presently, the Federal Constitution offers the
criminal defendant and female prospective juror no protection
from gender based peremptory challenges. Part II argues that the
New York State Constitution offers extended protection to
criminal defendant's and female prospective juror's rights beyond
those guaranteed under the Federal Constitution. This Part
concludes that attorney use of peremptory challenges predicated
solely on the basis of gender is prohibited by the New York State
Constitution.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Women and Jury Service in New York State
A survey of New York State legislative acts regarding jury
selection from 1683 to 1937 shows that women were statutorily
prohibited from serving on a jury. 13 In 1683, section 5 of the
Charter of Liberties and Privileges of 1683 called for "a jury of
amendment violation when six of seven prosecution peremptory challenges
were used to exclude males).
12. See infra Part III, sections C and E.
13. People v. Irizarry, 142 Misc. 2d 793, 800, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630, 633
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1988), rev'd, 165 A.D.2d 715, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279
(1st Dep't 1990).
In 1870, Wyoming was the first state to allow women to serve on a jury.
Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury-Selection Procedures after Taylor v.
Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REv. 1, 51-53 (1975). In 1898, Utah was the first
state to statutorily permit women to serve on a jury. Mahoney, Sexism in Voir
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twelve men as near as may be peers or equals .. . .- 14 Chapter
378 of the Laws of 1896 stated that only "[a] male citizen of the
United States of at least ten years' standing, and a resident of the
county" may serve on a jury. 15 Furthermore, New York State
Constitutions of 1777, 1821, 1846, 1894 also failed to confer the
right to women. 16
At that time, New York State's exclusion of women from jury
service was constitutionally permissible under Strauder v. West
Virginia,17 an 1879 United States Supreme Court decision. In
Strauder, the Supreme Court invalidated, under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment, 18 a state statute that
prohibited blacks from jury service. 19 The Court went on to add,
however, that the states still had the authority, absent a racial
basis, to exclude certain groups, including women, from jury
service. 20
At the turn of the twentieth century, the New York State
Legislature passed two acts which sought to prohibit racial
discrimination in its jury selection process. In 1895, the New
York State Legislature passed a statute entitled, "An Act to
Protect All Citizens In Their Civil and Legal Rights," ' 21 which
14. Irizarry, 142 Misc. 2d at 800, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
15. People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 530, 52 N.E. 572, 573 (1899).
16. Bamberger, Democraticizing the Supreme Court: 300 Years of the
Jury, May-June 1991 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 30, 32.
17. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
18. The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o State
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306.
20. Id. at 310. The Court stated:
We do not say that within the limits which it is not excluded by
the amendment a State may not prescribe the qualifications of its jurors,
and in so doing make discriminations. It may confine the selection to
males . . .We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever
intended to prohibit this. Its aim was against discrimination because of
race or color.
Id.
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prohibited exclusion from jury service based on race, creed or
color. 2 2 In 1909, section 13 of New York Civil Rights Lawn
was enacted which also prohibited disqualification from jury
service based on race, creed or color.2 4 Both of these acts,
however, failed to include women as one of the groups not
subject to exclusion.
In 1936, New York State's Judicial Council recommended that
women should be eligible for jury service. 25 Interestingly, this
recommendation was based on the need to secure a larger and
better educated juror pool rather than on equality principles.2 6 A
year later, the legislature followed the Council's recommendation
and eliminated the male gender only qualification by amending
sections 502,27 59828 and 68629 of the New York Judiciary
Law.3 0 In 1938, the legislature again amended section 13 of the
civil rights law to add "sex" as a classification protected from
jury selection discrimination. 31 The legislature also amended
section 596 of New York Judiciary Law in 1940 to explicitly
grant women the right to serve on a jury. 32 Section 599,
however, permitted women an automatic exemption from jury
22. Id.
23. Act of February 17, 1909, ch. 14, § 13, 1909 N.Y. Laws 620, 621
(see, Consolidated Laws of 1909, ch. 6, codified as amended by N.Y. Cirv.
RIGHTS LAw § 13 (McKinney 1976)).
24. Id.
25. SECOND REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, 87, 94 (Albany, 1936).
26. Irizarry, 142 Misc. 2d at 801, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
27. Act of May 24, 1937, ch. 513, §§ 1, 2, 1937 N.Y. Laws 1171, 1171
(McKinney) (repealed 1977).
28. Id. at N.Y. Laws 1172-73.
29. Id. at N.Y. Laws 1173-74.
30. Irizarry, 142 Misc. 2d at 801, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
31. Act of March 26, 1938, ch. 163, § 1, 1938 N.Y. Laws 684, 684
(codified as amended N.Y. CIV. RIGHTs LAW § 13 (McKinney 1976)). In
1945, the legislature added national origin as a protected classification. Act of
March 27, 1945, ch. 292, § 2, 1945 N.Y. Laws 672, 672-73 (codified as
amended N.Y. Crv. RIGHTs LAW § 13 (McKinney 1976)).
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service that was not provided for men.33
This automatic exemption effectively diminished the woman's
right to serve on a jury. Instead of summoning women for jury
service and then asking them if they wanted an exemption, the
county jury board34 would only subpoena women who
affirmatively volunteered for jury service. 35 In People v.
Cosad,36 the county court observed that the Jury Board of Seneca
County had systematically excluded women from jury service
resulting in a violation of the criminal defendant's state and
federal constitutional rights. 37 This decision was unfortunately
overshadowed by the United States Supreme Court decision in
Fay v. New York38 which held that the automatic exemption for
women was constitutional.
39
In 1974, the constitutionality of New York State's automatic
exemption for women was again under attack in National
Organization for Women v. Goodman.40 In Goodman, the New
33. Id. at 773. Section 599 provided, in pertinent part, that "[e]ach of the
following persons . . . , although qualified, is entitled to exemption from
service as a juror upon claiming exemption therefrom: ... (7) a woman." Id.
34. A county jury board typically consists of a resident supreme or
appellate court judge, a county judge and a member of the county board of
supervisors. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 503 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1991).
35. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 277-78 (1947) (court discusses
women's privilege, not duty, to serve on a jury).
36. 189 Misc. 939, 73 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Cty. Ct. Seneca County 1947).
37. Id. at 940, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
38. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
39. Id. at 278. The automatic exemption for women was later reaffirmed
as being constitutional in Hoyt v. Florida, where the Supreme Court, quoting
Fay, stated that women have the privilege but not the duty to serve on a jury.
368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
40. 374 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); accord DeKosenko v. Brandt, 63
Misc. 2d 895, 313 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970), aff'd, 36
A.D.2d 796, 318 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st Dep't 1971). A female plaintiff, involved
in a civil action to be tried before a jury, also contested the constitutionality of
female automatic exemption. Id. at 896, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 828. In dismissing
her claim, the judge added, "the [p]laintiff is in the wrong forum. Her lament
should be addressed to the 'Nineteenth Amendment State of Womanhood'
which prefers cleaning and cooking, rearing of children and television soap
operas, bridge and canasta, the beauty parlor and shopping .... " Id. at 898,
313 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
[Vol 8
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York Chapter of the National Organization for Women (NOW)
brought an equal protection claim of gender based discrimi-
nation. 41 NOW claimed that the automatic exemption labeled
women with stereotypical roles of being a "housewife" and
"rearer of children." 42 To bolster its claim, NOW stated that
then-recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Reed v.
Reed43 and Frontiero v. Richardson44 would likely prohibit the
automatic exemption under heightened judicial scrutiny.45 The
district court, however, stated that Reed and Frontiero did not
overrule Fay, and held that the automatic exemption for women
was still constitutional. 46 The district court added that it was up
to the New York State Legislature to modify the automatic
exemption rule.47
In 1975, the New York State Legislature did amend section 599
of the New York Judiciary Law by eliminating the automatic
exemption for women. 48 This change, however, was in response
to the Supreme Court's pending decision of Taylor v. Louisiana4 9
rather than the district court's invitation. 50
In Taylor, the Supreme Court rejected the state of Louisiana's
practice of automatically exempting women from jury service,
stating that the criminal defendant's sixth amendment right5 ' to
an impartial jury calls for mandatory inclusion of women in the
41. Goodman, 374 F. Supp. at 248.
42. Id.
43. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (prohibiting male preference in appointing men
over women as administrators of decedent estates).
44. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (prohibiting female officers of the United States
Air Force from having to prove their spouses are dependent for more than half
of the officer's support while no such requirement exists for male officers).
45. Goodman, 374 F. Supp. at 249.
46. Id. at 250.
47. Id.
48. Act of July 1, 1975, ch. 382, § 1, 1975 N.Y. Laws 547, 547
(McKinney) (repealed 1978).
49. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
50. See People v. Parks, 41 N.Y.2d 36, 42, 359 N.E.2d 358, 363-64, 390
N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (1976).
51. The sixth amendment states, in part, that "[in all criminal
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jury pool. 52 The Court observed that exclusion of this group,
which consisted of fifty-three percent of the citizens eligible for
jury service, would deprive the defendant of being tried by a jury
which truly represented a fair cross section of the community.
53
Correctly fearing that Taylor would invalidate New York
State's automatic exemption, the legislature passed a non-gender
based parental exemption for people caring for children under
sixteen years of age.5 4 Therefore, under present New York State
law, women and men are statutorily obligated to be summoned
for jury service55 and have an equal opportunity to be
disqualified, 56 excused57 or exempted. 58
B. Jury Selection Process in New York State
In New York State, each county59 contains a jury board, 60
which supervises the jury selection system in its respective
county.61 Every four years the county jury board appoints a
commissioner of jurors to administer the jury selection system. 62
The commissioner of jurors enforces "the laws and rules relating
to the drawing, selection, summoning and impanelling of
jurors. "63
A commissioner of jurors has the discretion to select
prospective jurors from among such sources as voter registration
lists, utility subscribers, motor vehicle operators and owners,
state and local taxpayers, and volunteers who have served in the
52. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537.
53. Id. at 531.
54. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 512(7) (McKinney 1975).
55. See infra note 73.
56. See infra note 70.
57. See infra note 71.
58. See infra note 72.
59. This is true, except in counties that contain cities with populations of
one million or more. In such cities it is the county clerk who exercises the
duties of the commissioner of jurors. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 502 (McKinney
1975).
60. See supra note 34.
61. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 502(a) (McKinney 1975).
62. Id. at § 504(a).
63. Id. at § 502(d).
[Vol 8
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past as jurors. 64 The commissioner, however, must select
prospective jurors from these lists at random65 and the jury
venire66 must represent "a fair cross-section [sic] of the
community," 6 7 and must be located in the jurisdiction of the
court.68 After selecting qualified6 9 prospective jurors, who are
neither disqualified, 70  excused71  nor exempted,
7 2  the
64. Id. at § 506.
65. Id. at § 507. The United States Supreme Court has held that states are
permitted to determine their own methods for selection of prospective jurors
"so long as the source reasonably reflects a cross-section [sic] of the
population suitable in character and intelligence for that civic duty." Carter v.
Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1970) (quoting from
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953)).
66. The venire is the group of prospective jurors summoned to appear at
court for jury selection. BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990).
67. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney 1975).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 510. To qualify as a juror, a person must: be a United States
citizen and be a New York State county resident; be between the ages of
eighteen and seventy-six; be in sound mental and physical condition; not have
a felony conviction; be intelligent and of good character;, be "able to read and
write the English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out..
. a juror qualification questionnaire"; and "be able to speak the English
language in an understandable manner." Id.
70. Id. § 511. A person can be disqualified from serving as a juror if he or
she is a member of the United States armed forces; is head of a civil
department or an elected officer of a village, town, county, city, state or
federal agency; is a federal judge or magistrate; or has served on a grand or
,petit jury within the state, including the federal court, within the last two
years. Id.
71. Id. § 517(c). A person may be excused from jury service if he or she
can prove that jury attendance "would cause undue hardship or extreme
inconvenience" to the prospective juror. Id. Usually a prospective juror can be
excused if he or she can show that he or she is in bad health or that there was a
recent death in the family. Id.
72. Id. § 512. A person may be exempted from jury service if he or she is
a member of the clergy or a Christian Science practitioner;, physician, dentist,
pharmacist, optometrist, psychologist, podiatrist, registered nurse, practical
nurse, embalmer, Christian Science nurse, prosthetist or orthotist; a practicing
attorney; a police officer, firefighter or peace officer; a sole proprietor of a
business; a person over seventy years old; a parent, guardian or other person
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commissioner of jurors, by service of summons, 73 orders those
selected to appear in court to begin the jury impanelment
process. 74 The impanelment process begins with the voir dire75
examination by the attorneys. 76
The voir dire stage77 of a criminal trial gives the attorneys
78
the opportunity to interrogate the prospective jurors to ascertain
their fitness to impartially decide the case. 79 Although the court
has broad discretion 80 to exclude statements or questions by an
attorney that are either irrelevant or repetitious, 81 it must allow a
fair opportunity for the attorney to question the prospective
juror's qualifications for jury service. 82 Any question asked in
73. Id. § 516. The commissioner can summon a prospective juror by mail
or by directing the sheriff to serve the summons. Id.
74. Id. § 500.
75. "This phrase denotes the preliminary examination which the court and
attorneys make of prospective jurors to determine their qualification and
suitability to serve as jurors." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed.
1990).
76. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.15 (McKinney 1982).
77. Procedurally, the court introduces twelve or more jurors for
questioning. Id. § 270.15(1). After both sides have been given the opportunity
to challenge for cause, the prosecution must exercise its peremptory challenges
before the panel is tendered to the defense for challenge. Id. § 270.15(2).
When a prospective juror is successfully challenged, the clerk of the court
replaces this person with a new prospective juror. Id. § 270.15(3). This
process continues until a jury is selected. Id.
78. In New York, it is the attorney who conducts the voir dire. Id. §
270.15(1). Along with New York, seventeen other states call for the attorneys
to conduct the voir dire examination; in thirteen states it is the judge who
conducts the examination; in the remaining nineteen states the judge and
attorney share in the responsibility of conducting the examination. V. STARR &
M. MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION: AN ATrORNEY's GUIDE TO JURY LAW
AND METHODs 40 (1985).
79. N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAW § 270.15(1) (McKinney 1982).
80. Id. § 270.15(1); see, e.g., People v. Boulware, 29 N.Y.2d 135, 272
N.E.2d 538, 324, N.Y.S.2d 30 (1971) (holding that defense counsel was not
allowed to question prospective jurors as to knowledge of the law), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972).
81. Id. § 270.15(1); see, e.g., Fortune v. Trainor, 19 N.Y.S. 598 (1892)
(improper to ask prospective juror a question that is irrelevant), aff'd, 141
N.Y. 605, 36 N.E. 740 (1892).
82. Id. § 270.15(1); see, e.g., People v. Corbett, 68 A.D.2d 772, 418
[Vol 8100
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order to elicit certain information regarding the prospective
juror's point of view with respect to the parties or subject matter
of the action, is usually deemed appropriate. 83 If an attorney
believes that a prospective juror is biased, he or she may seek to
remove the juror under the statutory rights of "challenge for
cause" 84 or "peremptory challenge. ' 85
C. Challenge for Cause
Historically, in New York State, challenges for cause have
been deemed an essential mechanism for obtaining an impartial
jury. 86 At common law, a prospective juror who, during the voir
dire examination, had formed or expressed an opinion that the
defendant was guilty would, as a matter of law, be disqualified
from serving on that jury.87 When the New York State criminal
system was codified, however, the equivalent statute contained a
modified version of the common law rule.88 This statute severely
limited the grounds for automatic disqualification, and provided
that if a prospective juror's "actual bias" 89 was shown, he90
could recite an "expurgatory oath" 91 to dispel doubt of his
N.Y.S.2d 699 (4th Dep't 1979) (court did not abuse discretion by precluding
defense counsel from asking prospective jurors about their attitudes towards
oral sex), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 714, 417 N.E.2d 567, 436 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1980).
83. Fortune, 19 N.Y.S. at 599.
84. N.Y. CRmi. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1982).
85. Id. § 270.25.
86. People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 426, 159 N.E. 379, 396 (1927).
87. Greenfield v. People, 74 N.Y. 277, 288-90 (1878) (prospective juror
who read a newspaper account of defendant's alleged crime and formed an
opinion of guilt was properly challenged for cause).
88. Act of May 3, 1872, ch. 475, 1872 N.Y. Laws 1133, 1133-34 (Code
Crim. Proc. § 376) (codified as amended, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAN'/ §
270.20(I)(b) (McKinney 1982)).
89. 1872 N.Y. Laws at 1133-34.
90. At this time women were excluded from jury service. See supra note
13 and accompanying text.
91. An expurgatory oath calls for the suspect prospective juror to declare
under oath that his or her biased opinions will not influence his or her verdict.
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alleged bias.92 In 1971, when the old code was superseded by the
present Criminal Procedure Law, the legislators deleted all
references to the "expurgatory oath" requirement. 93
Under the present statute, 94 a prospective juror may be
properly excluded if it is shown that: 1) the person displays a
particular bias that may prejudice the verdict; 95 or 2) the person
is related to the defendant; 96 or 3) the person was a witness of
the alleged crime; 97 or 4) that person served on a grand jury that
indicted the defendant. 98
Subsequent interpretation of the rule has given the "[tirial
[j]udge greater flexibility and greater responsibility in
determining" whether a prospective juror "should be excused for
cause." 99 If an attorney can prove that the prospective juror
shows an inability to be impartial, 100 the trial judge should
disqualify the juror. 101 Despite the greater judicial latitude for
excusing a prospective juror for cause, the rule still has its
limitations.
In New York State, the courts have imposed a high burden of
proof to show impartiality, 102 and evidence of possible bias
92. See, e.g., People v. McQuade, 110 N.Y. 284, 300, 18 N.E. 156, 162
(1888).
93. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1982); see also People
v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 77, 432 N.E.2d 758, 761, 447 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888
(1982) (court held that trial court's refusal to discharge a prospective juror
who made remarks showing racial bias prejudiced a black defendant).
94. N.Y. CRIm. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1982).
95. Id. § 270.20(b).
96. Id. § 270.20(c).
97. Id. § 270.20(d).
98. Id. § 270.20(e).
99. People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 104 n.2, 305 N.E.2d 469, 478 n.2,
350 N.Y.S.2d 381, 394-95 n.2 (1973).
100. It is also within the judge's discretion to excuse a prospective juror if
he or she believes the person is impartial. People v. Fernandez, 301 N.Y. 302,
320, 93 N.E.2d 859, 868 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 914 (1951).
101. See Branch, 46 N.Y.2d at 650, 389 N.E.2d at 469, 415 N.Y.S.2d at
987.
102. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882, 472 N.E.2d 1026, 483
N.Y.S.2d 198 (1984) (holding that a prospective juror can be excused for
cause only if there is a substantial risk of partiality).
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usually does not excuse the prospective juror for cause. 103
Furthermore, an attorney is precluded from using the rule in
instances where he or she has a strong belief that the prospective
juror harbors a bias towards his or her client, yet has no actual
proof to offer to the court. 104
The New York State courts have permitted litigants the
freedom to question a prospective juror's possible partiality in
areas such as religion, race and national origin. 105 To uncover
these biases, however, usually requires extensive questioning l o
and courts have sought to curtail the time permitted during the
voir dire examination. 107 Moreover, an attorney may feel that he
or she may prejudice the client's case by asking sensitive
questions regarding a person's background or viewpoints that
could lead to alienating the selected jurors. 10 8 Therefore, to
avoid possible compromise of the client's rights, it seems prudent
to simply peremptorily challenge the suspect prospective juror
rather than confront the already mentioned obstacles by
103. See, e.g., People v. Duffy, 124 A.D.2d 258, 508 N.Y.S.2d 267 (3d
Dep't 1986) (holding that a prospective juror's social contact with the district
attorney was not sufficient to be excused for cause).
104. Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between
Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 356 (1982)
[hereinafter Saltzburg].
105. People v. Presley, 22 A.D.2d 151, 254 N.Y.S.2d 400 (4th Dep't
1964) (litigants are permitted to question prospective jurors regarding their
membership in racial, political or social organizations), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 738,
209 N.E.2d 729, 262 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1965). See also People v. Rubicco, 42
A.D.2d 719, 345 N.Y.S.2d 624 (2d Dep't 1973) (litigants are permitted to
question prospective jurors regarding prejudice towards national origin), aft'd,
34 N.Y.2d 841, 314 N.E.2d 344, 359 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1974).
106. See Saltzburg, supra note 104, at 356.
107. See People v. Jean, 75 N.Y.2d 744, 551 N.E.2d 90, 551 N.Y.S.2d
889 (1989) (litigants are given fifteen minutes during the first two rounds of
voir dire and ten minutes during the third round of examination). See also
People v. Garrow, 151 A.D.2d 877, 542 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1989) (not abuse of
discretion to limit each attorney's voir dire questioning to ten minutes in first
round); People v. Barry, 134 A.D.2d 917, 522 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1987) (time
limitation on voir dire did not violate due process since defense counsel had
equal time to question).
108. People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d 1056, 1066, 526 N.Y.S.2d 367, 374
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challenging for cause. 109
D. Peremptory Challenge
In People v. Thompson, 110 the court stated, "[tihe right to ex-
ercise peremptory challenges, unlike the right to exercise chal-
lenges for cause, is not an essential part of the mechanism for ob-
taining an impartial jury . . . . II The Kings County Supreme
Court, in People v. Muriale,112 added that "[p]eremptory chal-
lenges by the defense may be regulated reasonably without violat-
ing a defendant's constitutional rights, and their exercise by the
defense may have to yield to more compelling public
interests." ' 113 Indeed, prior state court opinions have granted the
legislature full discretion, without judicial intervention, in
deciding which litigant is entitled to the challenge and how many
are to be permitted. 114
In 1777, New York State's first constitution granted both the
prosecutor and the defense the right to peremptory challenges. 115
In 1786, however, the New York State Legislature enacted a
statute abolishing the prosecution's right to peremptory
challenges. 116 At that time, the defense was allowed thirty-five
challenges. 117 In 1828, the legislature decreased the amount of
peremptory challenges permitted to the defense to twenty without
109. See Saltzburg, supra note 104, at 355-57.
110. 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (2d Dep't 1981).
111. Id. at 96, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
112. 138 Misc. 2d 1056, 526 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988).
113. Id. at 1060, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 370. According to the Kings County
court, the compelling interests were public confidence in the justice system,
the rights of minority jurors and the right to an impartial representative jury.
Id. at 370-73.
114. See People v. Lobel, 298 N.Y. 243, 257, 82 N.E.2d 145, 151 (1948);
People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 426, 159 N.E. 379, 385 (1927) (both courts
stating that "[t]he matter of peremptory challenges rests entirely with the
Legislature"); People v. McQuade, 110 N.Y. 284, 292, 18 N.E. 156, 158
(1888) ("The subject is regulated by statute.").
115. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d at 97, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
116. Id. at 98, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 747-48.
117. Id. at 97, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
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allowing any for the prosecution. 118 In 1858 the prosecution was
granted peremptory challenges, under the state constitution,
depending on the severity of the crime. 119 The statute, however,
permitted the prosecution only five challenges compared to the
defendant's twenty. 120 In 1873, the legislature modified the
peremptory challenge statute to allow the prosecution the same
amount of challenges as the defense. 121 In addition, the modifica-
tion allowed the parties to peremptorily challenge prospective ju-
rors for all felonies and misdemeanors. 122
Under the present statute, 123 the parties are allowed twenty
challenges for a class A felony, 124 with two additional challenges
for each alternate juror selected; 125 fifteen challenges for a class
B or class C felony, 126 with two additional challenges for each
alternate juror selected; 127 and ten challenges for all other cases,
with two additional challenges for each alternate juror
selected. 128
Despite the New York State court's lack of judicial support, the
United States Supreme Court, while holding that the peremptory
challenge rule is not a constitutional requirement, 129 has
proclaimed that it is essential to the American system of
118. Id. at 98, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
119. Id. at 98-99, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Under the 1858 law, the
prosecution was permitted five peremptory challenges for criminal offenses
punishable by death or ten or more years imprisonment. The defense was given
twenty challenges for such crimes. For less severe crimes, the prosecution was
granted three challenges while the defense was allowed five challenges. Id.
120. Id. at 99, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. N.Y. CRai. PRoc. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1982).
124. The maximum sentence for a class A felony is life imprisonment. N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 70(2)(a) (McKinney 1987).
125. N.Y. CImi. PRoc. LAW § 270.25 (2)(a) (McKinney 1982).
126. The maximum sentence for a class B felony is twenty-five years
imprisonment. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70(2)(b) (McKinney 1987). For a class C
felony the maximum sentence is fifteen years imprisonment. Id. at § 70(2)(c).
127. N.Y. CRi. PRoc. LAW § 270.25(2)(b) (McKinney 1982).
128. Id. § 270.25(2)(c).
129. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (noting that
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justicel 30 as a means of securing an impartial jury. 131
The peremptory challenge serves as a last resort for the
attorney to eliminate juror bias where the selection process and
challenges for cause have failed. 132 It also allows an attorney to
exclude suspect prospective jurors who may hold a bias towards
his or her client, but will not admit to the bias when
questioned. 133 Furthermore, it allows the attorney to exclude a
juror whom he or she believes will be too influential upon the
other jury members or too disruptive to effectively work in a
group setting.1 34 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the rule
gives the criminal defendant confidence that the jury selected will
afford him or her a fair and impartial verdict. 135
The peremptory challenge rule, however, is subject to abuse
when the attorney, instead of searching for characteristics that
may show impartiality, chooses to rely on negative stereotypes,
prejudices and other biases when deciding to exclude a
prospective juror. 136 If this bias is directed towards a certain
group, an attorney can, by exercise of the peremptory challenge,
effectively eliminate that group from jury service. 137 In 1965,
the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
such actions by a prosecutor violated a criminal defendant's
constitutional rights when they decided Swain v. Alabama. 138
130. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (stating that
the peremptory challenge is "one of the most important of the rights secured to
the accused"). See also Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (noting
that the peremptory challenge is one of the most effective methods to exclude
unfit jurors from jury service).
131. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
132. See Saltzburg, supra note 104, at 357.
133. Id. at 356.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 356-57.
136. See Note, Sex Discrimination in the Voir Dire Process: The Rights of
Prospective Female Jurors, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1225, 1244 (1985).
137. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN
COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 154 (1977) [hereinafter VAN
DYKE).
138. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
[Vol 8
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/4
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
II. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
A. Criminal Defendant's Right to Equal Protection
In Swain, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari to decide whether the prosecution's peremptory chal-
lenges used to exclude six black prospective jurors violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 139 The de-
fendant was forced to base his claim on this amendment because
the sixth amendment right to a jury trial, by an impartial jury,
was not yet binding on the states. 140
In its opinion, the Court sought to protect the peremptory chal-
lenge rule, stating that there is a presumption that the prosecutor
uses the challenge to secure an impartial jury. 141 The Court con-
cluded that a primafacie case of purposeful discrimination in the
use of peremptory challenges is not made out merely by showing
the exclusion of blacks in a given case. 142 Rather, it must be
shown that the prosecution had systematically excluded every
member belonging to the same racial group from the petit jury
over a period of time. 143 After Swain was decided, criminal
defendants found it difficult to meet the burden of proof required
139. Id. at 221.
140. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (holding that the
sixth amendment right to a jury trial is binding on the states under the
fourteenth amendment).
141. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-22. "To subject the prosecutor's challenge in
any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal
Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of
the chalenge. The challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremp-
tory .... I"d.
142. Id. at 227.
143. Id. at 222. The Supreme Court went on to affirm the state conviction
on the grounds that the defendant failed to offer substantial proof that the
prosecutor systematically excluded all blacks from the petit jury. Id. at 224.
Justice Goldberg believed, however, that the defendant did meet the
requirements under the Swain test. Id. at 238 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). He
noted that no black had ever served on a petit jury in Talladega County,
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to make out a violation. 144 One federal circuit court of appeals
noted that the Swain test required the defendant "to investigate,
over a number of cases, the races of persons tried in the
particular jurisdiction, the racial composition of the venire and
petit jury, and the manner in which both parties exercised their
peremptory challenges." 145 Concern over these difficulties led
states to extend their own constitutional protection to prohibit
peremptory challenges predicated solely on the basis of racial
bias. 146 The Supreme Court also recognized these difficulties and
reformulated the Swain test in Batson v. Kentucky. 147
In Batson, a black male defendant was indicted on charges of
second degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 148 During
the jury selection process, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged
all four prospective black jurors, thus causing an all white jury to
be selected. 149 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to
decide whether these challenges violated the defendant's
144. See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979)
(black defendants were convicted by an all white jury and could not overcome
presumption that prosecutor was acting to select a fair and impartial jury);
United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975) (defendant's proof that
in fifteen cases against black defendants the Government had excluded 81 % of
blacks from juries failed to show that Government acted discriminatorily),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); State v. Steward, 255 Kan. 410, 591 P.2d
166 (1979) (no error when trial judge refused to dismiss the jury on grounds
that prosecutor excluded all blacks from the jury panel); Commonwealth v.
Green, 246 Pa.Super. 472, 400 A.2d 182 (1979) (exclusion of seventeen black
prospective jurors did not establish prejudicial discrimination on part of
prosecutor).
145. United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971).
146. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499
(Mass.) (presumption of proper use of peremptory challenges is rebuttable by
showing pattern of challenges against members of discrete groups), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); see also People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583
P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978) (noting that the test posed problems with:
1) indigent defendants' ability to pay the legal costs to uncover the facts
necessary to prove a claim; 2) the resistance of trial judges in permitting the
extra court time required to decide such claims; and 3) the lack of information
that details the names and races of people who were peremptorily challenged).
147. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
148. Id. at 82.
149. Id. at 83.
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constitutional right to equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment. 150 In reversing the conviction, the Court held that
the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude
prospective jurors solely on the basis of race violated the
defendant's right to equal protection. 151
In its opinion, the Court recognized that the Swain test placed a
"crippling burden of proof" on criminal defendants. 152
Consequently, the Court overruled the portion in Swain that
forced defendants to make out a fourteenth amendment challenge
over a series of cases and replaced it with a new standard that al-
lowed criminal defendants to establish a prima facie case solely
on the facts of their trial. 153
According to Batson, the criminal defendant establishes a prima
facie case that the prosecution's peremptory challenges result in
purposeful discrimination by showing that: 1) he or she is a
member of a cognizable racial groupl 54 and that the prosecutor's
peremptory challenges removed a member whose race is the same
as the defendant's;155 2) the state's peremptory challenge rule is
subject to discriminatory abuse by the prosecutor; 156 and 3) facts
and other relevant information that are introduced as sufficient to
raise an inference that the peremptory challenges were used for
discriminatory purposes. 157 If the defendant is able to make out a
prima facie claim of purposeful discrimination, the prosecutor
may rebut this claim by offering a race neutral explanation for
the exercise of the challenges. 158
In regard to the third part of the test, the Supreme Court essen-
tially allowed the state trial courts to determine instances of
150. Id. at 82.
151. Id. at 89.
152. Id. at 92.
153. Id. at 95.
154. A cognizable group may be defined as one having common traits that
define and limit the group, or share basic attitudes, ideas or experiences.
United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468
F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973).
155. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
156. Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
157. Id.
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racially discriminatory peremptory challenges by the
prosecution. 159 The Court did add, however, that a criminal
defendant may establish a prima facie claim of discrimination by
showing that the prosecution has systematically excluded blacks,
by peremptory challenge, during the voir dire examination. 160 In
addition, the criminal defendant may establish a claim on the
basis of racially discriminatory questions or comments made by
the prosecutor while examining the prospective jurors. 161
While the Court did not fully enunciate the guidelines for deter-
mining an acceptable race neutral explanation for excluding black
prospective jurors, 162 they did state it "need not rise to the level
justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." 163 The Court,
however, added that the prosecution must offer more than a mere
denial of discriminatory motive or display a minimal showing of
good faith for excluding the black prospective jurors. 164 The
Court noted that it was unacceptable for the prosecution to
exclude black prospective jurors because it believed they would
be partial to a black defendant. 165 According to the Court, "[a]
person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.' 166
Subsequent to Batson, the Supreme Court has further modified
and clarified its test. In Powers v. Ohio,167 the Court held that a
criminal defendant may assert a Batson claim even though he or




162. The Court essentially left it to the discretion of the trial judges "to
decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors."
Id.
163. Id. (citing McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1132 (2d Cir. 1984));
see also Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 478
U.S. 1001 (1986)).
164. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625, 632 (1972)).
165. Id. at 97 (comparing Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598-99
(1935)).
166. Id. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
167. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
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prospective jurors. 16 8 In allowing the white criminal defendant
standing to sue, the Powers Court permitted the defendant to
assert the equal protection rights of the excluded black
prospective jurors. 169 In Hernandez v. New York, 170 the Court,
in a plurality opinion noted that the prosecution's
disproportionate removal of members of a racial class, absent a
racial motive, does not constitute a Batson violation. 17 1
In EdMonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,172 the Supreme Court
has also extended Batson to prohibiting the racially based
peremptory challenge by the defendant in civil proceedings. 17 3
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Edmonson, observed that, a fortiori,
this decision must extend Batson to prohibiting the criminal de-
fendant from exercising racially based peremptory challenges. 174
Batson and its progeny represent another significant step in
eradicating racial discrimination in the jury selection process. The
Batson test, however, still does not fully protect a criminal defen-
dant from being tried by a truly unrepresentative jury. By
limiting its holding to instances of only racially based peremptory
challenges, criminal defendants are still susceptible to being tried
and convicted by an unrepresentative jury resulting from the
systematic exclusion of other certain cognizable groups. 175 While
168. Id. at 1366.
169. Id. at 1374.
170. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
171. Id. at 1867-68.
172. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
173. Id. at 2080.
174. Id. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Further evidence is found in
Holland v. Illinois, where five Justices, writing in three separate opinions,
believed that Batson should be extended to prohibiting the criminal defendant
from the use of racially based peremptory challenges. 110 S. Ct. 803, 811
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 812 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined
by Brennan and Blackmun, J.J.); id. at 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. For example, in United States v. Sgro, the defendant who claimed to
be of Italian-American descent appealed an extortion conviction contending
that the prosecutor peremptorily challenged the only two ethnic Italians on the
jury venire. 816 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063
(1988). The court of appeals, while not recognizing that Batson extends to
other cognizable groups, ruled that the defendant failed to prove Italian-
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a criminal defendant is not entitled to a jury that must contain
members of his or her own race or color, 176 the defendant "does
have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected
by nondiscriminatory criteria." ' 177 Aside from the criminal
defendant, the female prospective juror is also adversely affected
by gender based peremptory challenges.
B. Female Prospective Juror's Constitutional Rights
In Carter v. Jury Commission,178 the Supreme Court recog-
nized that "[d]efendants in criminal proceedings do not have the
only cognizable legal interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection.
People excluded from juries because of their race are as much ag-
grieved as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a
system of racial exclusion." 179 While Carter only dealt with the
exclusion of blacks in the jury pool stage of jury selection, 180 the
Batson Court also recognized that racially based discrimination,
exercised by the use of peremptory challenges, violates the
excluded juror's constitutional right to serve on a jury. 181 In
Powers, the Court implicitly ruled that black prospective jurors
have standing to assert a Batson violation. 182 Women, like
blacks, are similarly aggrieved when they are unfairly excluded
from jury service.
673 F. Supp. 96, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that Italian-Americans do
qualify as a cognizable group for purposes of proving a prima facie claim of
discrimination under Batson), af'd, 853 .F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988). A
commentator also noted that attorneys frequently classify prospective jurors'
fitness to serve on a jury on the basis of their ethnicity, national origin,
religion and political affiliation. Alsehuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury:
Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 153, 181-82 (1989) [hereinafter Alschuler].
176. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879).
177. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1367.
178. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
179. Id. at 329.
180. Id. at 322.
181. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (citing Strauder, 100
U.S. at 308; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1881); Carter, 396 U.S.
at 329-330)).
182. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1371-73 (1991).
[Vol 8
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/4
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
In Strauder, the Court noted that the exclusion of blacks from
jury service "is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the
law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of
the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all
others."' 183 Likewise in Frontiero v. Richardson,184 the Court
observed that gender classifications "have the effect of
invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal
status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual
members." 185
In 1946, the United States Supreme Court, in Ballard v. United
States,186 first began to discuss the adverse aspects of systematic
exclusion of women from the jury pool. 187 In Ballard, the Court
was confronted with a non-constitutional issue of whether the
systematic exclusion of women from the jury pool violated sec-
tion 275 of the Federal Judicial Code. 188 This statute called for
the federal district court to apply the law of the state in which it
is located when determining the qualifications of a juror. 189
In California, where the case arose, state law permitted women
to serve on a jury. 190 The Southern Federal District Court of
California, however, failed to summon any women for jury ser-
vice. 191 The petitioners 192 contended that the district court's
systematic exclusion of women violated the federal statute. 193 In
reversing the federal court conviction, the Court agreed with the
petitioners and concluded that the congressional intent of the
statute mandated that women be included in the jury pool. 194
183. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
184. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
185. Id. at 687.
186. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
187. Id. at 193.
188. Id. at 190.
189. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 191.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 189-90.
192. The petitioners were appealing from a conspiracy conviction. Id. at
188.
193. Id. at 190.
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In its opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the view that a truly
representative jury need only consist of members who have
differing social, economic and political backgrounds. 195 The
United States Government claimed that an "all male panel drawn
from the various groups within a community will be as truly
representative as if women were included." ' 196 The Supreme
Court explained that "[]ury competence is an individual rather
than a group or class matter."' 197 The Court believed that the
"subtle interplay of influence one on the other" requires women
to be present on a jury. 198
This view in Ballard later became a constitutional requirement
in 1975 when the Court decided Taylor.199 In Taylor, the Court
noted that "women are sufficiently numerous and distinct from
men and that if they are systematically eliminated from jury
panels, the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section [sic]
requirement cannot be satisfied.''2°° Despite the Supreme Court
states allowed women to serve on a jury and therefore must have intended to
include women on a jury when they enacted the statute. Id.
Section 1862 of the Federal Jury Selection Act provides that "[nio citizen
shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of
the United States... on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
or economic status." 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982).
195. Id. at 193.
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946)).
198. Id. at 193-94.
199. Taylor v. Louisana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); see supra notes 49-53 and
accompanying text.
200. Id. at 531.
In Duren v. Missouri, the Supreme Court described what is required to make
a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement. 439 U.S. 357,
364 (1979). According to the Court:
-A defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;
and (3) that this under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of
the group in the jury-selection process.
Id.
Under a fair cross section challenge, the defendant need not show purposeful
discrimination by the prosecution. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
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warning, women have continued to be systematically excluded
from jury service. 20 1 For example, in People v. Mires,2°2 the
defendant, who was a black woman, appealed a murder
conviction, contending that the prosecution's use of six
peremptory challenges to exclude black female prospective jurors
violated her equal protection rights under Swain.203 When the
trial judge asked the prosecutor for his reason for excluding these
women, he simply responded that he did not want an "all-woman
jury. "204 The appellate court found no error and affirmed the
conviction. 205
This practice of excluding women on the basis of their gender
has been fueled by members of the legal profession, pointing to
what they believe are strategic reasons for excluding prospective
female jurors from jury selection. For example, one commentator
stated that women have "prejudices that infect women in their
jealousies against other women," and that "[ffemale jurors may
react subconsciously with aversion toward a younger or more
attractive female litigant."' 20 6 Another commentator, a famous
trial lawyer, stated, "[w]omen jurors tend to be more acutely
opinionated and come to a quicker. . . decision than the male
juror .... Once a female juror makes up her mind.., even the
most cogent of reasons rarely changes it.",207 Lastly, a Dallas,
Texas prosecutor's trial manual stated, "I don't like women
jurors because I can't trust them. They do, however, make the
best jurors in cases involving crimes against children. It is
482 (1977) (evidence that county population was 79 % Mexican-American, but,
over eleven year period only 39 % of grand jurors were Mexican-American).
201. See Daniels v. State, 581 So. 2d 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (nine
women excluded); People v. Ashley, 207 Ill. App. 3d 984, 566 N.E.2d 745
(1991) (nine women excluded); People v. Crowder, 1616 I1. App. 3d 109,
515 N.E.2d 783 (1987) (twelve of thirteen peremptory challenges used to
excuse women).
202. 103 Ill. App. 3d 673, 431 N.E.2d 1126 (1981).
203. Id. at 676, 431 N.E.2d at 1128.
204. Id. at 675, 431 N.E.2d at 1127.
205. Id. at 679, 431 N.E.2d at 1130.
206. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L.
Rv. 545, 553 (1975).
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possible that their 'women's intuition' can help you if you can't
win your case with the facts ".'208
Despite the presence of this invidious discrimination, these
practices have persisted, unchallenged by constitutional scrutiny.
In Taylor, the Court declared "that the Sixth Amendment affords
the defendant in a criminal trial the opportunity to have the jury
drawn from venires representative of the community, [therefore]
we think it is no longer reasonable to hold that women as a class
may be excluded or given automatic exemptions based solely on
sex .... ",209 It seems plain that the criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to a jury, which is representative of the
community, should extend to the peremptory challenge stage of
jury selection. 2 1
0
The Supreme Court, however, recently decided in Holland v.
Illinois,21 1 that Taylor's fair cross section requirement under the
sixth amendment does not extend to the peremptory challenge
stage of jury selection. 2 12 Besides Holland's limitation, Taylor
does not provide women independent grounds to sue because only
a criminal defendant can assert a claim under the sixth amend-
ment. 2 13 Therefore, Batson provides a woman the sole means of
protecting her constitutional rights if she believes that she was
unfairly excluded by a peremptory challenge.
Assuming Batson is applicable to gender based peremptory
208. See VAN DYKE, supra note 137, at 152 (quoting Texas Observer, May
11, 1973, at 9, col. 2.).
209. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537.
210. Justice Marshall also called for the sixth amendment to be extended to
the peremptory challenge stage of jury selection. He contended that "[t]here is
no point in taking elaborate steps to ensure that Negroes are included on
venires simply so they then can be struck because of their race by a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges." McCray v. New York, 461 U.S.
961, 968 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
211. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
212. Id. at 807 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527). According to the Court,
once the venire is fairly selected, attorneys are then given unrestricted use of
peremptory challenges. Id.
213. The sixth amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
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challenges, the female prospective juror must overcome other
practical considerations. The female prospective juror may be un-
aware that she was discriminatorily excused from jury service.2 14
Justice Murphy, dissenting in Fay v. New York,2 15 observed that
"[w]e can never measure accurately the prejudice that results
from the exclusion of certain types of qualified people from a
jury panel. Such prejudice is so subtle, so intangible, that it
escapes ordinary methods of proof." 2 16 Justice Kennedy,
concurring in Holland, added that even if a prospective juror
does detect discrimination, it is unlikely that he or she will raise a
claim given the little incentive and resources available to mount
such a legal claim. 2 17
Both blacks and women share a long history of discrimination
in the jury selection process. Both groups have been subject to a
complete denial of being allowed to serve on a jury.2 18 Similarly,
both groups have been subject to systematic and purposeful
exclusion in attorneys' use of peremptory challenges. Therefore,
it seems reasonable that women should be given the same
protection afforded to blacks under Batson.
214. See Alschuler, supra note 175, at 193-94.
215. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
216. Id. at 300 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
217. Holland, 110 S. Ct. at 812 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also
Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372-73 (noting the problems black prospective jurors
confront in asserting an equal protection claim under Batson); Bobb v.
Municipal Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 860, 192 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1983). A female
prospective juror, an attorney, refused to answer voir dire questions
concerning her marital status and spouse's occupation on the basis that the
court failed to ask the same questions of the male prospective jurors. Id. at
S62-63, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 274. The First District Court of Appeal in California
ruled that she was not in contempt of court for her refusal to answer such
questions and held that the court's questions were violative of her equal
protection rights under the California State Constitution. Id. at 864-67, 192
Cal. Rptr. at 271-74.
218. Cf. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684 ("Throughout much of the 19th Century
the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that
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C. The Applicability of Batson to Gender Based Discrimination
Traditionally, the fourteenth amendment was reserved to
prohibit instances of racial discrimination. 219  The Supreme
Court has stated, however, that other groups with past histories
of discrimination deserve heightened fourteenth amendment
protection. 220 In the past, the Court has recognized that women
are a cognizable group in need of such constitutional
protection. 221  The Court, nevertheless, seems reluctant to
provide women the same protection afforded to blacks in
eradicating discrimination in the jury selection process. The
following Supreme Court decision is illustrative of this
reluctance.
In Alexander v. Louisiana,2 22 a black defendant, convicted of
rape, alleged he was denied equal protection on the basis that the
state's method of composing its jury lists had excluded blacks and
women from jury service. 223 The Court reversed the conviction
on the grounds that blacks were excluded from jury service, but
chose not to hear the issue of whether the exclusion of women
denies the criminal defendant equal protection. 224 The Court
219. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879)
(stating that the purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race or color).
220. The Supreme Court asserted that when a class is "single[d] out.., for
different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees
of the Constitution have been violated." Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
478 (1954).
221. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75
(1971). More recently, a federal district court added: "It is beyond dispute that
women comprise a cognizable group for the purposes of the first element of the
prima facie cases for violations of either the sixth amendment or Equal
Protection Clause." United States v. Donohue, 574 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (D.
Md. 1983).
222. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
223. Id. at 626-27.
224. Id. at 633-34 (citing Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295
(1905)). The Court stated that since the defendant's conviction was reversed on
racial grounds, there was no need to address the issue of whether the exclusion
of women violates the defendant's equal protection rights under the fourteenth
[Vol 8118
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contended that "this claim is novel in this Court" and found
"nothing in past adjudications suggesting that [criminal
defendants have] been denied equal protection by the alleged
exclusion of women from grand jury service. ' "225
Furthermore, over the past fifteen years the Court has explicitly
given gender based claims less judicial scrutiny than that of race
when envoking an equal protection violation.2 6 In Korematsu v.
United States,227 the Court stated that any racial classification, to
withstand a fourteenth amendment equal protection challenge,
must pass a "strict scrutiny" test. 228 This test requires the state
to show that its legislative act is "suitably tailored to serve a
compelling state interest." 229 Whereas under the less demanding
"intermediate approach," for a gender classification to survive a
fourteenth amendment challenge it "must serve important
govenmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." 230
Uncertainty over whether Batson applies to gender based
amendment. Id.
225. Id. Justice Douglas contended that the Court should have addressed the
issue of whether the state could restrict a woman's right to jury service. Id. at
634 (Douglas, I., concurring). Justice Douglas observed that "[t]he issue
[was] squarely presented, it has been thoroughly briefed and argued, and it is
of recurring importance." Id. (Douglas, J., concurring). The Justice proceeded
to conclude that "[a] statutory procedure which has the effect of excluding all
women does not produce a representative jury, and is therefore repugnant to
our constitutional scheme." Id. at 644. (Douglas, J., concurring).
226. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (a gender
classification against male purchasers of 3.2% beer did not substantially
further an important governmental interest).
According to Justice Powell, gender classifications have been given less
judicial scrutiny than racial classications because the latter "presents far more
complex and intractable problems than gender-based classifications. More
importantly, the perception of racial classifications as inherently odious stems
from a lengthy and tragic history that gender based classifications do not
share." Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303
(1978).
227. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
228. Id. at 216.
229. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).
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peremptory challenges has led to differing views among the
federal circuit courts. In United States v. DeGross,231 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that Batson does apply to
the use of peremptory challenges exercised solely on the basis of
gender.232 Conversely, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Hamilton,233 has determined that
Batson does not apply to such discrimination. 234
In Hamilton, the criminal defendants petitioned for, but were
denied, a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court over the issue
of whether Batson applies to gender based peremptory chal-
lenges. 235 While the Supreme Court's denial of a writ of
certiorari certainly "imports no expression of opinion upon
merits of the case," 236 it does mean that the issue of whether
Batson extends to gender based discrimination, in the near future,
remains uncertain.237
The uncertainty over Batson's applicability to gender based
peremptory challenges has forced criminal defendants and female
prospective jurors to seek protection under their own respective
state constitutions. 238 Similar to the time when, under Swain,
231. 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990).
232. Id. at 1423.
233. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1109 (1990).
234. Id. at 1042-43.
235. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Hamilton, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1109 (1990).
236. United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923).
237. "Because no issue of gender discrimination was presented in Batson
and because the Supreme Court did not discuss the merits of this issue even in
dictum, the burden of providing a reasoned consideration of the litigant's claim
must fall initially upon lower courts." Alschuler, supra note 175, at 180 n.
107.
238. See State v. Levinson, 71 Haw. 492, 795 P.2d 845 (1990) (exclusion
of women on the basis of gender denies them equal protection under state
constitution); State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986) (holding
that state constitution prohibits use of peremptory challenges against potential
jurors, who are members of a cognizable group, on the basis of a presumed
bias); State v. Gonzales, 111 N.M. 590, 808 P.2d 40 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)
(defendant made out prima facie case of discrimination on basis of gender in
jury selection in violation of state constitution).
In Rhode Island, however, the state supreme court held that its state
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the complainant's high evidentiary burden to prove a racially
based peremptory challenge claim forced the states to fashion
remedies under their own respective state constitutions, the states
are again being called upon to protect against gender based
peremptory challenges. 239  Accordingly, the next section
discusses whether these aggrieved parties are protected under the
New York State Constitution.
III. THE NEW YORK STATE
CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS THE USE OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES PREDICATED
SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF GENDER
A. Introduction
In 1984, a task force was created to investigate areas of
discrimination that women encounter under the New York State
court system. 240 After an examination of state statutes, court
rules and practices, the task force concluded that "[w]omen are
often denied equal justice, equal treatment and equal
opportunity" under the New York State court system.241 This
task force recommended that the judiciary should take a more
active role in promoting equality among women and men in court
proceedings. 242 Despite the task force's recommendation, the
judiciary was still reluctant to protect women from being
peremptorily challenged solely on the basis of their gender.
For example, in People v. S.R. ,243 the Bronx County Supreme
constitution does not prohibit gender based peremptory challenges. State v.
Oliveria, 534 A.2d 867 (1987).
239. People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 360-61, 552 N.E.2d 621, 626,
553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 90 (1990) (Kaye, I., dissenting), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1859
(1991).
240. Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15
FoP.DHAM URB. L. J. 16 (1986-1987).
241. Id. at 15.
242. Id. at 166.
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Court had the first opportunity, post-Batson, to decide whether
the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges purposely
excluded women on the basis of their gender. 244 The defendant
moved for a mistrial contending that the prosecutor's exclusion of
women by peremptory challenge violated his rights under the
equal protection clauses of both the fourteenth amendment of the
Federal Constitution and the New York State Constitution. 245
The prosecutor, apparently thinking that he was being asked to
articulate a non-racial reason as to why he excluded these
women, responded: "The challenges.. . are based upon gender
and not challenges based upon race. What I mean by that is it is
my position that men tend to be less sympathetic than women so I
am chosing [sic], I would opt more men over women." '246
Despite the discriminatory remark by the prosecutor, the court
denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial. 247
In its opinion, the court acknowledged that women experience
discrimination under the New York State judicial system. 248
Furthermore, the court stated that women deserve the same
protection as blacks receive under the federal and state
constitutions, thus implicitly holding that Batson should apply to
gender based discrimination. 249 The court, however, ruled that
the prosecutor's statements were not violative of the federal and
state constitutions because the prosecutor did not systematically
exclude all female prospective jurors from jury service. 250
In People v. Merkle,251 the Second Department of the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division also had an opportunity to decide
whether the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges purposely
244. Id. at 55, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
245. Id. at 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 58, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
248. Id. at 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 57-58, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 866. The court noted that the prosecutor
failed to challenge four prior female prospective jurors. Id. at 58, 517
N.Y.S.2d at 866-67. The court also noted that the final composition of the
jury was ten women and two men. Id. at 58, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
251. 143 A.D.2d 145, 531 N.Y.S.2d 601 (2d Dep't 1988).
[Vol 8
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excluded women on the basis of gender. 252 The defendant, a
male, was appealing a conviction by an all white jury of first-
degree sexual abuse on the basis that the prosecutor
systematically excluded women by use of his peremptory
challenges.25 3 The defendant alleged that the prosecutor violated
his rights under Batson when the prosecutor peremptorily
challenged seven of nine women present during the voir dire ex-
amination. 254
Without deciding whether Batson is applicable to gender based
discrimination, 25 5 the court stated that the "prosecutor satisfied
whatever duty he may have had to offer a nondiscriminatory
reason for use of peremptory challenges," thereby affirming the
conviction. 25 6 The court noted that the prosecutor allowed one
woman to serve on the jury, but she was excluded by the
defendant's peremptory challenge.25 7 The court also noted that
the prosecutor permitted a woman to serve as an alternate
juror.258 Finally, the court explained that the prosecutor
"articulated a non-gender-related basis for his exercise of
peremptory challenges as against almost all of the prospective
female jurors." 259
As S.R. and Merkle succinctly demonstrate, female prospective
jurors and criminal defendants are still not fully protected from
discrimination arising from gender based peremptory
challenges. 260 An attorney should be required to provide a
252. Id. at 145, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. "We need not decide whether the scope of Batson v[.] Kentucky...
is limited to cases of racial discrimination in the jury selection .... ." Id. at
146, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 145, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
258. Id.
259. Id. The prosecutor contended that he wanted female jurors who had
young daughters since the victim was also a young female. Id. at 145.46, 531
N.Y.S.2d at 602. Therefore, he excluded seven of the nine female prospective
jurors because they did not have any daughters. Id. He excluded the eighth
female prospective juror because she had an older daughter. Id.
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gender neutral reason for all uses of peremptory challenges. 261
In regard to racially based peremptory challenges, the New York
Court of Appeals in People v. Jenkins,262 applying federal
constitutional law, noted that "[f]or purposes of equal protection,
the constitutional violation is the exclusion of any blacks solely
because of their race." 263 This Comment argues that the court
of appeals can apply this same reasoning for gender based
peremptory challenges under its own state constitution.
B. State Authority to Extend Constitutional Protection
In Cooper v. California264 and Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins,265 the Supreme Court has held that the states are
permitted to grant or extend constitutional protection beyond that
provided under the Federal Constitution. 266 This view was
echoed in People v. P.J. Video, Inc.,267 where the New York
Court of Appeals noted that:
Under established principles of federalism . . . the States ...
have sovereign powers. When their courts interpret State statutes
or the State Constitution the decisions of these courts are
conclusive if not violative of Federal Law. Although State courts
may not circumscribe rights guaranteed by the Federal
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988) (discussing the problems of fully protecting all
unfairly excluded black prospective jurors from racially based peremptory
challenges).
261. Cf. People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 558, 554 N.E.2d 47, 51, 555
N.Y.S.2d 10, 14 (1990) (noting that there can be a Batson violation even
though the prosecution did not peremptorily challenge all black prospective
jurors).
262. 75 N.Y.2d 550, 554 N.E.2d 47, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1990).
263. Id. at 559, 554 N.E.2d 51-52, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15 (emphasis in
original).
264. 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (holding that state can provide increased
protection from improper searches and seizures than is provided under the
fourth amendment).
265. 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that a state can restrict private owner's
right to exclude as long as it does not contravene a federal constitutional
provision).
266. Id. at 81; Cooper, 386 U.S. at 62.
267. 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986), cert.
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Constitution, they may interpret their own law to supplement or
expand them.
268
The court added that "[i]n the past we have frequently applied
the State Constitution, in both civil and criminal matters, to
define a broader scope of protection than that accorded by the
Federal Constitution in cases concerning individual rights and
liberties."-26 9
In regard to protecting criminal defendants and prospective
jurors from discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, early
decisions by the court of appeals were not responsive to
broadening the scope of Batson under the state constitution. 270 In
denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
268. Id. at 302, 501 N.E.2d at 559-60, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
269. Id. at 303, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912; see also Cooper
v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979) (stating
that pretrial detainees in county jails are entitled to visitation rights under the
state constitution's due process clause while not so under the federal
equivalent), cert. denied sub. nom., Lombard v. Cooper, 446 U.S. 984
(1980); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d
714 (1978) (positing that the state constitution's due process clause provides a
criminal defendant more protection than the federal equivalent in regard to
police brutality and coercion); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d
894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976); People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239
N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968) (both stating that defendant's right to
counsel is more broad under the state constitution than the federal equivalent).
270. The New York State lower courts have been more responsive to
broadening Batson's scope of protection under the state constitution. See
People v. Green, 148 Misc. 2d 666, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130 (County Ct.
Westchester County 1990) (the county court extended Batson by recognizing
that hearing impaired prospective jurors are protected under the state's equal
protection clause); People v. Davis, 142 Misc. 2d 881, 537 N.Y.S.2d 430
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1988) (the supreme court extended Batson by
recognizing that white prospective jurors, along with black prospective jurors,
are protected under the state's equal protection clause in ruling that the defense
is prohibited from exercising racially based peremptory challenges). People v.
Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d 1081, 526 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1988) (the protection clause prohibited racially based peremtory challenges
exercised by the defense); People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d 1056, 526
N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988) (the supreme court extended
Batson by recognizing that the state's equal protection clause prohibited the
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fact, in People v. Scott,271 People v. Hernandez,272 and People
v. Jenkins,273 the court of appeals chose to decide possible
instances of discriminatory use of racially based peremptory
challenges under federal constitutional law rather than state
constitutional law.274
The court of appeals' reason for deciding possible violations of
Batson under federal law can be found in the Esler v. Walters,275
where it was determined that the New York State Constitution's
equal protection clause276 offered no greater protection than that
of the federal equal protection clause found in the fourteenth
amendment. 277 Since the criminal defendants in Scott, Hernandez
and Jenkins all asserted federal equal protection claims, 278 the
court apparently believed it was unnecessary to decide whether
the prosecutor's alleged racially based peremptory challenges
271. 70 N.Y.2d 420, 516 N.E.2d 1208, 522 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1987).
272. 75 N.Y.2d 350, 552 N.E.2d 621, 553 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1990), aff'd, 111
S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
273. 75 N.Y.2d 550, 554 N.E.2d 47, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1990).
In Jenkins, the court of appeals did broaden the scope of Batson under the
Federal Constitution by allowing a criminal defendant to make out a prima
facie claim of discrimination, even though the prosecutor did not peremptorily
challenge all of the black prospective jurors. Id. at 556, 554 N.E.2d at 50, 555
N.Y.S.2d at 13. The court added that there is a Batson violation if the
prosecution is found to have excluded a single prospective juror solely on the
basis of race. Id. at 559, 554 N.E.2d at 51- 52, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15.
274. Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals, dissenting in
Hernandez, believed that the court of appeals should have decided the
prosecution's alleged discriminatory use of peremptory challenges under state
constitutional law rather than federal constitutional law, thereby permitting the
court to increase the protective scope of Batson. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at
360, 552 N.E.2d at 626, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
275. 56 N.Y.2d 306, 437 N.E.2d 1090, 452 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1982).
276. The New York State Constitution's equal protection clause provides
that "[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
277. Esler, 56 N.Y.2d at 313-14, 437 N.E.2d at 1094, 452 N.Y.S.2d at
337.
278. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 352-53, 552 N.E.2d at 621, 533 N.Y.S.2d
at 85; Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d at 553, 554 N.E.2d at 48, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 11;
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were violative of the state constitution's equal protection
clause.279 The court of appeals, however, broke away from
deciding possible instances of discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges under federal law when it decided People v. Kern.2
80
In Kern, the court of appeals was confronted with the issue of
whether the defense is prohibited from exercising racially based
peremptory challenges. 281 During the trial court's voir dire
examination, the defense peremptorily challenged several black
prospective jurors, thus causing the prosecution to claim a Batson
violation. 282 When the defense failed to offer a race neutral
explanation for challenging one of the black prospective jurors,
the trial judge ordered her to be seated among the other accepted
jurors. 2
83
Since the United States Supreme Court did not address this
issue in Batson,2 84 the court of appeals turned to the state
constitution and found that the defense's racially based
peremptory challenges were violative of both the equal protection
clause2 85 and the civil rights clause286 of article I, section 11 of
279. In Hernandez, the court of appeals stated, "[o]ur analysis of the record
and issues of this case on the merits would produce the same result under the
Federal and State equal protection right .... " 75 N.Y.2d at 358, 552 N.E.2d
at 624, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
280. 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1991).
281. Id. at 649, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
282. Id. at 647, 554 N.E.2d at 1239, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
283. Id. at 647-48, 554 N.E.2d at 1239, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 651. This juror,
however, was later excused by the court due to her son's illness. Id. at 648,
554 N.E.2d at 1239, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 651. The defendants appealed
nevertheless contending that the trial court unconstitutionally restricted their
peremptory challenges. Id. at 648, 554 N.E.2d at 1240, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
284. In Batson, the Supreme Court stated, "[w]e express no views on
whether the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory
challenges by defense counsel." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12
(1988).
285. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
286. The civil rights clause states, in pertinent part, that: "No person shall,
because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in
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the state constitution. 2 87 In prohibiting the defense from
exercising racially based peremptory challenges, the court
expanded Batson's scope of protection by allowing the
prosecution to assert an equal protection claim in place of the
excluded black prospective jurors even though the state was not a
member of a cognizable racial group of excluded prospective
jurors. 28
8
In Kern, the court of appeals did not address whether gender
based peremptory challenges were prohibited under the state con-
stitution. 2 89 This issue was subsequently decided by lower courts
in People v. Irizary 290 and People v. Blunt,29 1 where both
courts ruled that the prosecution is prohibited from exercising
gender based peremptory challenges. 292 These two decisions,
however, offer little insight as to why the state constitution
prohibits gender based peremptory challenges. 293
In Irizarry, the court decided the issue under federal constitu-
287. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 650, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
288. Id. at 654 n.3, 554 N.E.2d at 1244 n.3, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 656 n.3.
289. Id. at 652, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655. The court of
appeals in Kern limited its holding to covering only race based peremptory
challenges. Id. at 642, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
290. 165 A.D.2d 715, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1st Dep't 1990).
291. 162 A.D.2d 86, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90 (2d Dep't 1990) aff'd on remand,
No. 901-05958, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12602 (2d Dep't Oct. 7, 1991).
292. Irizarry, 165 A.D.2d at 718, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 281; Blunt, 162 A.D.2d
at 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
293. See People v. Irizarry, 142 Misc. 2d 793, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1988), rev'd, 165 A.D.2d 715, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (2d Dep't
1990). The Bronx County Supreme Court offered an extensive analysis of
gender based discrimination in the jury selection process. Id. at 800-06, 536
N.Y.S.2d at 633-37. The appellate division, in reversing the supreme court,
did not disagree with the court's decision that gender based peremptory
challenges are prohibited. It reversed on the grounds that the prosecution failed
to offer a gender neutral reason for excluding the female prospective juror.
Irazarry, 165 A.D.2d at 718, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 281 (citing People v. Jenkins,
75 N.Y.2d 550, 558-59, 554 N.E.2d 47, 51-52, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 14-15
(1990)). While the Bronx County Supreme Court stated that gender based
peremptory challenges are violative of the state constitutional provisions of
sections 1, 2, 6, and 11 of Article I, and section 18 of Article VI, it only fully
discussed such discrimination under the state's equal protection clause. Id. at
808-11, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 638-39.
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tional law294 and in Blunt, while holding that gender based
peremptory challenges are violative of the state constitution's
equal protection clause, the court failed to explain why it is
violative of the provision. 295 Moreover, the Blunt court only
addressed the criminal defendant's state constitutional rights, thus
ignoring the female prospective juror's rights under the state
constitution. 296  The following analysis, however, will
demonstrate that the female prospective juror, along with the
criminal defendant, are properly protected under the state
constitution's equal protection clause.
C. New York State Constitution's Equal Protection Clause
In Kern, the court of appeals explained that section 11 of article
I of the state constitution contains two provisions. 297 The first
provision, the so-called "equal protection clause," provides that,
"[n]o person shall be denied equal protection of the laws of this
state or any subdivision thereof." 298 The second provision, the
so-called "civil rights clause," which will be discussed in the fol-
lowing section, provides that "[n]o person shall, because of race,
color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his
civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation or
institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the
294. Irizany, 165 A.D.2d at 716, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 280. This decision is
also subject to criticism because the appellate court, in holding that Batson
prohibits gender based peremptory challenges, mistakenly stated that the
United States Supreme Court applies a "strict scrutiny" test to gender based
classifications. Id. at 716, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 280. According to the Supreme
Court, such classifications require intermediate level scrutiny. See supra notes
225-29 and accompanying text.
295. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d at 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
296. The court did note that gender based peremptory challenges violate a
citizen's right to jury service, but it failed to state whether the unfairly
excluded prospective juror has standing to assert an equal protection claim
under the state constitution. Id. In Irizany, the court stated that under federal
constitutional law, a female prospective juror has standing to assert a Batson
claim. Irizarry, 165 A.D.2d at 718, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 281.
297. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 650-51, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 55 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
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state. "2 99
In regard to the equal protection clause of the state constitution,
the Kern court concluded that race based peremptory challenges
are violative of this provision.300 Likewise, the second de-
partment of the appellate division in Blunt, following the
rationale of Kern, concluded that the state's equal protection
clause also prohibits gender based peremptory challenges. 30 1
In Blunt, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged eleven women
from jury selection while excluding only one man. 302 On appeal,
the defense contended that the prosecutor's actions amounted to a
violation of the defendant's state constitutional rights under the
equal protection clause. 303 The prosecution asserted that the
defendant lacked standing to sue since he was not a member of
the excluded class as called for under the Batson test. 304
Referring to Kern, the court ruled that a male had standing to
make a claim of discrimination even though he was not a member
of the excluded class. 305 In Kern, the court of appeals held that
the prosecution had standing to sue even though it was not a
member of a cognizable group because an aggrieved party's race
is irrelevant to an equal protection standing inquiry. 3°6
According to the Blunt court, a criminal defendant's gender is
equally as irrelevant in being able to assert an equal protection
claim. 307
Turning to the issue of gender based peremptory challenges,
the court pointed out that jury service is a privilege of citizenship
protected under the state constitution and civil rights law. 308
299. Id.
300. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 657, 554 N.E.2d at 1246, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
301. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d at 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
302. Id. at 88, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
305. Id.
306. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 654 n.3, 554 N.E.2d at 1245 n.3 555 N.Y.S.2d at
656 n.3.
307. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d at 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
308. Id. at 88-89, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § I
and N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney 1976)). Section I of article I
of the New York State Constitution provides: "No member of this state
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Applying the rationale in Kern,309 the court believed that the
privilege of jury service logically extends to prohibiting gender
discrimination under the state constitution's equal protection
clause.3 10 The court then stated that the Batson test is applicable
to defendant claims of gender discrimination regarding the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.311
Applying the Batson test, the court ruled that the defendant had
made out a prima facie claim of discrimination. 312 The court
then remitted the case back to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the prosecutor had a gender neutral
explanation for excusing the eleven women from jury service. 313
If the court of appeals applied the same level of constitutional
scrutiny to gender based discrimination as they apply to racially
based discrimination, then the Blunt court would have properly
concluded, without further discussion, that Kern extends to
gender based peremptory challenges. The court of appeals,
however, has followed the United States Supreme Court view
that gender based discrimination deserves only "intermediate
level scrutiny" 314 while race based discrimination deserves the
shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured
to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his
peers .... " N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
Section 13 of the New York Civil Rights Law provides, in pertinent part,
that: "No citizen of the state possessing all other qualifications which are or
may be required or prescribed by law, shall be disqualified to serve as a grand
or petit juror in any court of this state on account of race, creed, color,
national origin or sex." N.Y. CIrv. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney 1978).
309. In Kern, the court of appeals held that the defense is prohibited from
peremptorily challenging blacks solely on the basis of race. 75 N.Y.2d at 642-
43, 554 N.E.2d at 1236, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
310. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d at 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
311. Id. at 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92-93.
312. Id. at 89-90, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
313. Id. On remand, the appellate division concluded that the prosecutor
failed to articulate a gender neutral explanation for excluding female
prospective jurors. No. 901-05958, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12602 (2d
Dep't Oct. 7, 1991).
314. People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 168, 474 N.E.2d 567, 576, 485
N.Y.S.2d 207, 216 (1984) (holding that the New York State rape statute that
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more stringent "strict scrutiny." 315 In People v. Liberta,316 the
court of appeals stated that a statute which permits unequal
treatment between men and women "violates equal protection
unless the classification is substantially related to the achievement
of an important governmental objective." 317
Applying the intermediate test, it can be shown that gender
based peremptory challenges, permissible under the New York
State peremptory challenge statute, 318 are violative of the state
constitution's equal protection clause. Peremptory challenges can
serve an important governmental objective by helping the litigants
secure a fair and impartial jury. 319 Permitting a party, however,
the right to systematically exclude women by peremptory
challenge thus resulting in an unrepresentative jury, will most
likely lead to an infringement of the other party's right to an
impartial jury.320  Furthermore, gender based peremptory
challenges fail to serve other important governmental objectives
such as protecting a female prospective juror's state constitutional
constitution), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
315. See Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d
537, 385 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1970); In re Quinton, 49 N.Y.2d 328, 402 N.E.2d
126, 435 N.Y.S.2d 788 (both holding that racial classifications require strict
scrutiny constitutional analysis).
316. 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
317. Id. at 168, 474 N.E.2d at 576, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
318. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1982).
319. See, e.g., People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 547-48, 443 N.E.2d
915, 917-18, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443-44 (1982) (describing the benefits of
peremptory challenges in achieving a fair and impartial jury), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 961 (1983); but see People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 96, 435
N.Y.S.2d 739, 747 (2d Dep't 1981) (noting that peremptory challenges are not
an essential method of securing an impartial jury).
320. Section 500 of the State's Judiciary Law provides "that all litigants in
the courts of this state entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and
petit juries selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community
.... " N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1991). According to
the Kings County Supreme Court, in People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d 1056,
526 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988), this statute is provided "to
insure that both sides at a trial have the benefit of an impartial jury." Id. at
1065, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
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right to serve on a jury32 1 and promoting the public's confidence
in the judicial system.322 Lastly, gender based peremptory
challenges are not substantially related to achieving an impartial
jury because a female prospective juror is excluded on the basis
of an attorney's own predisposed negative viewpoint of women
rather than her own incompetence as a juror.3 23 Therefore, both
the female prospective juror and the criminal defendant should be
able to assert that gender based peremptory challenges are
violative of their equal protection rights under the state
constitution. It seems doubtful, however, that these parties can
receive the same protection under the state constitution's civil
rights clause.
D. New York State Constitution's Civil Rights Clause
As mentioned in the preceding section, the New York State
Constitution's civil rights clause specifies that a person shall not
be discriminated in his or her civil rights on the basis of race,
color, creed or religion. 324 According to the 1938 New York
State Constitutional Convention, the term "civil rights" was
interpreted to mean such rights defined by other provisions of the
constitution, statute or common law. 325 In Kern, the New York
Court of Appeals held that racially based peremptory challenges
are prohibited under the civil rights clause of the state
constitution because it is also expressly prohibited under the New
321. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654
(citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1).
322. Id. at 654, 554 N.E.2d at 1243-44, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655-56 (quoting
Batson, 476 U.S. at 87-88); see also Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d at 1060-61, 526
N.Y.S.2d at 370.
323. See People v. Irizarry, 142 Misc. 2d 793, 810, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630,
639 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1988) (stating that gender based peremptory
challenges fail the intermediate scrutiny test because there is no justification
for excluding a female prospective juror on the basis of her gender), rev'd on
other grounds, 165 A.D.2d 715, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1st Dep't 1990).
324. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
325. 4 Rev. Record of N.Y. State Constitutional Convention, 2626 (1938);
see also Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 531, 87 N.E.2d
541, 548 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950); Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 651,
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York Civil Rights Law. 326
This statute, entitled "Right to Serve on Juries," ' 327 provides,
in pertinent part, that "[n]o citizen of the state possessing all
other qualifications which are or may be required or prescribed
by law, shall be disqualified to serve as a grand or petit juror in
any court of this state on account of race, creed, color, national
origin or sex . -328 Since the classification of race is
enumerated in both this statute and the civil rights clause
provisions, the court properly concluded that racially based
peremptory challenges are prohibited under the civil rights clause
of the state constitution. 329
Unfortunately, a female prospective juror is unable to assert a
claim under the civil rights clause because gender is not specified
as a prohibited classification. 330 She could, however, assert that
a gender based peremptory challenge constitutes a statutory
violation of section 13 of the civil rights law. 331
Similarly, a criminal defendant is not protected under the civil
rights clause. A criminal defendant could assert that his or her
civil right to an impartial jury, as provided under section 12 of
the state's civil rights law, 332 is violated by gender based
peremptory challenges. Since criminal defendants are also not
listed as a protected group, they suffer the same problem as
female prospective jurors. Both a criminal defendant and female
prospective juror, however, can assert that gender based
peremptory challenges violate their rights under section one of
326. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 653, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
327. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney 1976).
328. Id.
329. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 653, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
330. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1982). In 1984, a
proposal was made to amend the state's civil rights clause to add gender, along
with race, color, creed and religion as a protected group. Legislative
Achievements for Women in New York State: A 20 Year Retrospective, New
York City Commission on the Status of Women at 47 (1985). This proposal,
however, failed to become law. Id.
331. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d at 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92; see supra note 308.
332. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 12 (McKinney 1976). Section 12 provides,
in pertinent part, that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to
... an impartial jury .... " Id.
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article one of the state constitution.
E. New York State Constitution's Rights and Privileges Secured
Provision
Section 1 of article I of the New York State Constitution
provides that, "[n]o member of this state shall be. .. deprived
of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof,
unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers
.... 333 In People v. Kagan,334 the Supreme Court of New
York County was confronted with the issue of whether this
provision protects a criminal defendant from allowing a
prosecutor to peremptorily challenge members of his own ethnic
group solely on the basis of their ethnicity. 335
In Kagan, two defendants who were Jewish were charged with
violations of a banking law.336 During jury selection, the
prosecutor peremptorily challenged all four prospective jurors
who were Jewish. 337 In interpreting section 1 of article I as pro-
hibiting the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges that
systematically exclude prospective jurors solely on the basis of
ethnic group, the court explicitly mentioned gender as one of the
groups that is protected under the state constitution. 338
In People v. Thompson,339 the Second Department of the
Supreme Court, Appellate Division also interpreted section 1 of
article I as prohibiting the use of peremptory challenges that
exclude cognizable groups. 340 In its opinion, the court explained
that the constitutional provision had been interpreted as entitling
333. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
334. 101 Misc. 2d 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1979).
335. Id. at 276, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 989. "This is a case of first impression,
the courts of New York never having had the occasion to pass upon this
question." Id.
336. Id. at 275, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
337. Id. at 277, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
338. Id. at 277, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
339. 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (2d Dep't 1981).
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the criminal defendant to a trial by an impartial jury. 341 An
impartial jury, according to the court, should consist of a fair
cross section of the community as constitutionally required under
Taylor.342 Thus, the court construed Taylor as extending the fair
cross section of the community requirement to the selection of the
petit jury.343 The court reasoned that Taylor should be extended
to peremptory challenges because the unfair exclusion of
cognizable groups, permitted under the peremptory challenge
rule, would lead to the same discriminatory impact as excluding
these groups from the jury venire. 344
It is arguable, however, that the court of appeals, in People v.
McCray,345 has effectively overruled Kagan and Thompson. In
McCray, the court stated that article I, section 1, of the
constitution did not grant a court the authority to interfere with
the attorney's use of peremptory challenges. 346 In its reasoning,
however, the court heavily relied on Swain's view of permitting
an attorney's unrestricted use of peremptory challenges. 347 Since
Batson overruled the burden of proof portion of Swain, it can be
argued that it is now McCray's holding which is suspect. 348 In
341. Id. at 96, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47.
342. Id. at 101, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
343. Id. The court also relied on section 500 of the Judiciary Law, which
provides that "[i]t is the policy of this state that all litigants in the courts of
this state entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries
selected at random from a fair cross-section [sic] of the community . .. .
N.Y. Jud. Law § 500 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1991).
344. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d at 101, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
Several other states have also held that the fair cross section requirement
extends to the petit jury. See Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Colo.
1987) ("right to an impartial jury includes the right to a jury drawn from a
... fair cross-section [sic] of the community"); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997
(Del. 1985) (state constitution provision is "functionally equivalent to the
Sixth Amendment fair cross section requirement..."), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1022 (1986).
345. 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
346. Id. at 550, 443 N.E.2d at 919, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
347. Id.
348. See People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d 1056, 1058-59, 526 N.Y.S.2d
367, 368-69 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988).
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fact, clear evidence in the overruling of McCray can be found in
Kern where the court of appeals rejected the defendant's
contention that section 1 of article I extends only to prohibiting
racial discrimination in the venire stage to jury selection. 349 In
Kern, the court stated that "[a] citizen's privilege to be free of
racial discrimination in the qualification for jury service is hardly
a privilege if that individual may nevertheless be kept from
service on the petit jury solely because of race." 350 Since Kagan
and Thompson seek to extend defendant's criminal right
protections, under the teachings of Cooper, Pruneyard and P.J.
Video, it seems desirable to leave those holdings undisturbed.
A female prospective juror can also assert a claim of
discrimination under this provision. In Kern, the court declared
that jury service is a privilege of citizenship protected under
section one of article one of the state constitution. 35 1 Following
the state legislative view that all eligible citizens are entitled to
serve on a jury, 352 the court proceeded to hold that jury service
"is a privilege of citizenship which may not be denied our
citizens solely on the basis of their race." 353 Since jury service is
most probably a fundamental right of citizenship, 354 women
should also be protected under this provision, thereby not
allowing an attorney to peremptorily challenge them solely on the
basis of their gender.355
349. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 652, 554 N.E.2d at 1242-43, 555 N.Y.S.2d at
654-55.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
352. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 500 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1991).
353. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 652, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
354. People v. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d 86, 88-89, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (2d
Dep't 1990); see also People v. Green, 148 Misc. 2d. 666, 669, 561
N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. New York County 1990) (noting that jury
service may be a fundamental right).
355. See People v. S.R., 136 Misc. 2d 45, 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866
("this court condemns discrimination based upon gender or race to be equally
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CONCLUSION
An unfettered peremptory challenge rule invites purposeful dis-
crimination. 356 As long as attorneys rely on negative stereotypes,
the peremptory challenge rule will always be subject to abuse. 357
By statutorily permitting up to twenty peremptory challenges, 358
an attorney can effectively eliminate a cognizable group if he or
she mistakenly believes that they possess a certain trait that might
be adverse to his or her client's case. New York State courts,
however, have determined that the peremptory challenge rule is
not essential for selecting a jury, 359 and therefore must yield to
more compelling state interests. 360
Moreover, the New York State Constitution and statutory law
contain provisions that call for the eradication of all forms of jury
selection discrimination. 361 Accordingly, New York State courts
have imposed restrictions on the use of the peremptory challenge
rule that go beyond those called for by the United States Supreme
Court. 362 One of these restrictions prohibits an attorney from
invoking this rule to exclude women solely on the basis of their
gender. 363 Perhaps, to fully ensure that the criminal defendant
and prospective female juror are granted full protection under the
state constitution, the New York State Legislature should limit
the amount of challenges364 or ban the statute in its entirety. 365
356. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). "Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for
striking a juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those
reasons." Id.
357. "It is even possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to
convince himself that his motives are legal." King v. County of Nassau, 581
F. Supp. 493, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
358. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 317-322 and accompanying text.
361. See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 11; see also N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§§ 12, 13 (McKinney 1976); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1991).
362. See supra note 293.
363. See supra Part III, sections C and E.
364. See People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 359, 552 N.E.2d 621, 625,
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Furthermore, the legislature should amend the state's civil rights
clause to add gender as a protected classification.366 This
amendment will bring women within the full state constitutional
protection as provided under Kern.367
Frederick T. Kelsey
553 N.Y.S.2d 85, 89 (1990) (Titone, J., concurring) (suggesting that the state
legislature limit the amount of peremptory challenges).
365. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (calling for peremptory challenges to be declared uncon-
stitutional).
366. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
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